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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  FOREIGN-EXCHANGE INTERVENTION: 
RECENT EXPERIENCE 
ABSTRACT 
Since the September 1985  Plaza  Hotel  announcement  by  the 
Group of Five  industrial countries, a substantial  realignment  of 
exchange rates has  been  achieved.  At  the  same  time,  foreign 
exchange market  intervention, much of  it concerted and much of  it 
sterilized, has been undertaken  on  a  scale  not  seen  since  the 
early 1970s  This paper takes a fresh look at  the effectiveness of 
sterilized  intervention in  the light of  recent experience. 
The paper concludes that sterilized intervention, in  itself, 
has  played  an  unimportant  role  in  promoting  exchange-rate 
realignment. Instead, clear shifts in  patterns  of  monetary  and 
fiscal policy appear to  have  been  the  main  medium-term  policy 
factors determining  currency  values.  Over  certain shorter  time 
periods,  intervention has influenced exchange  markets  through  a 
signalling channel; but this signalling effect has been  operative 
only as a result of  authorities'  frequent  readiness  to  adjust 
monetary policies promptly to  counteract unwelcome exchange-market 
pressures. The paper makes some progress  in  formalizing  reasons 
why intervention might enhance the credibility  of  messages  that 
governments  could convey as well  through simple  verbal  announce- 
ments  - 
Maurice  Obstfeld 
Department of  Economics 
University of  Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA  19104 But ultimately  there are limits to  what can be  achieved by  a pure 
intervention policy.  The monetary  crises under  the Bretton Woods 
system showed  that powerful  market  trends  cannot  be suppressed 
through exchange market  interventions by central banks,  and more 
recent  monetary  history has reaffirmed this. 
Deutsche Bundesbank  (1982,  p. 25) 
Introduction 
In a report  published  in July  1985.  economic  policymakers 
from ten industrial countries reviewed the performance  of floating 
exchange rates to  date and  concluded  that "the key elements of the 
current  international  monetary  system  require  no  major 
institutional  change."  Within three  months,  however,  finance 
ministers  and  central-bank  governors  from  five  of  the  largest 
industrial  countries  announced  their  readiness  for  concerted 
action  to  reduce  the  United States  dollar's  foreign-exchange 
value,  The Group  of Five's  announcement, made at the Plaza Hotel 
in  New  York on  Sunday,  September  22,  initiated  a  series  of 
international accords centered around the management of  key dollar 
exchange  rates.2 Understandings  concerning joint  intervention  in 
foreign  exchange  markets  have  figured  prominently  in  these 
accords, which  thus represent a clear modification of  the distaste 
for  intervention  that  prevailed  during  the  first  half of  the 
'See "Report of the Deputies: The Functioning of the International 
Monetary  System,"  IMF Survey,  Supplement  on  the  Group  of Ten 
Deputies' Report  (July 1985), pp. 2-14. 
'The Group  of Five  (G-5)  countries  are France,  Germany,  Japan, 
the United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States. The  Group  of Seven 
(G-7) consists of  the G-5 plus Canada and Italy; the Group of Ten 
(C-iD), of  the G-7 plus Eelgium,  the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
1 Reagan  administration. 
Thia  paper  focuaes  on the  recent  practice  and  effecta  of 
foreign-exchange  intervention  by  the  three  largest  industrial 
economies,  Germany, Japan,  and the United  States. A wide variety 
of economic  policy  tools--monetary,  fiscal,  and  commercial,  to 
name just three--can  he used  to  influence  exchange  rates.  To 
isolate  the  "pure"  effects  of  intervention  on  exchange  rates, 
the  discussion  below  distinguishes  between  sterilized 
interventions,  vhose  monetary  effecta  are  neutralized  by 
offsetting  domestic  liquidity  measures,  and  nonsterilized 
interventions,  which alter  money supplies  and  rherefore  involve 
the joint  exercise of  monetary policy  and exchange-market  policy. 
If effective  in achieving  significant and sustained  exchange-rate 
changes,  sterilized  intervention  could  give  governments  an 
additional  policy  tool helpful in resolving conflicts between  the 
monetary policies  apprepriate  for  internal  balance  and  these 
appropriate  for external balance. 
In  June 1982, participants at the Versailles  economic  summit 
comaissiened  an  official  Working  Group  on  Exchange  Market 
Intervention  to  study the efficacy  of  government  interventions in 
exchange  markets.  The  Working  Group's April 1983  report concluded 
that  sterilized  intervention is a relatively  weak instrument  of 
exchange-tate  policy,  with little  apparent  effectiveness  beyond 
the very short run. This  finding is in accord  with the quotation 
from  the Bundesdbank  reproduced above, as well as with academic 
research  on  the subject,  which reaches  conclusions  that arm  at 
2 least  as  negative.3  In  the  months  since  the  Plaza  meeting. 
however,  a substantial  realignment  of industrial-country  currency 
values  has been  achieved and  exchange-market  intervention (much of 
it sterilized) has been conducted  on a scale  not  seen since  the 
early 1970s. A fresh look at  intervention experience may yield new 
conclusions,  conclusions  relevant  for  evaluating  the  recent 
experience  of international policy  coordination and the prospects 
for its future success. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  I  reviews  the 
recent evolution  of key  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  other  than 
intervention,  that are  likely to  have  influenced  exchange  rates. 
This  narrative  Sets  out  the  macroeconomic  context  in  which 
intervention  has  been conducted,  and  also  provides  information 
needed  for  assessing  intervention's  independent  role  in 
currency-market  developments. 
Section II then  sets out the mechanics of  both sterilized and 
nonsterilized  intervention,  emphasizing  the  effects  on  asset 
supplies of  alternative  intervention strategies. Portfolio-balance 
theories of  effective sterilized intervention are reviewed in this 
section,  which  also  presents  some  econometric  evidence  on 
foreign-currency risk  premiums. 
Section III considers an  alternative to  the portfolio-balance 
rationale  for  sterilized  intervention,  the  "signalling"  theory. 
According  to this view,  official portfolio shifts between nonmoney 
3A recent  survey  of  research on sterilized intervention is Weber 
(1986).  The  conclusions  of Federal Reserve  participants  in the 
Versailles  Working  Group  are  summarized by Henderson  and Sampson 
(1983)  - 
3 terms) by 45 percent  against the Ceraan mark and by 25 percant 
against  the  Japanese  yen;  by  the  end  of August  1985,  having 
depreciated from  February  levels by 19.4 percent against the mark 
and by 9.4 percent  against the yen,  the dollar seemed  set on the 
necessary  downward  adjustment path.5  (See figures 1  and 2, which 
show bilateral  nominal  exchange rates  from the  end  of 1978  and 
from the start  of 1985, respectively.) A sharp  dollar upswing  in 
the first week  of  September 1985, occurring against a backdrop of 
rising  protectionism  in  the  U.S.  Congress,  was  the  catalyst  for 
the  C-S  Plaza  announcement  and  the  approach  to  exchange-rate 
management it initiated.7 
Significant  milestones  in  the  ongoing  evolution  of  this 
approach include the following: 
Plaza  agreement  (Septeher  22,  1985).  Participants  agreed 
that "exchange  rates  should better reflect  fundamentml  economic 
conditions  than  has been the case,"  that "in view  of the present 
and prospective  changes  in  fundamentals,  some further  orderly 
appreciation  of  the main  non-dollar currencies  against the dollar 
is  desirable,"  and  that  C-S  governments would "stand ready to 
cooperate  more closely  to encourage this when to do so would be 
helpful."  Funabashi  (1988) has  given  an account  of the meeting 
5The  cited changes  are  based  on  end-of-month  exchange  rates, 
expressed  as dollars per foreign currency unit.  Between  December 
1978  and  August 1985,  the  U.S.  price  level  had  risen  by  a 
greater  percentage  than  Japan's  or  Cermany's  had,  so  even a 
complete  reversal  of  the nominsl  exchange-rate  movements  up  to 
February  1985  would  not have  restored  the  real exchange  rates 
prevailing at the period's start. 
7The  dollar's  September  surge  is  not  visible  in  the 












































































































































































































3based,  in  part, on interviews with  unnamed participants.  According 
to  this  account,  an  understanding  was  reached  to  conduct 
simultaneous  sales of  up to  $18  billion, with the goal of lowering 
the dollar's  value  by 10 to 12 percent over  a period of six weeks. 
The  implications  of  this  intervention  for  national  monetary 
policies  and interest  rates--and,  in particular,  the question  of 
sterilization- -were  apparently  not discussed.  Pledges  on fiscal 
policy  were made,  however,  including a U.S.  pledge  to pursue  tax 
reform  and  government  deficit  reduction. 
•  Coordinated  interest-rate  reductiong  (March-April 1986)..  On 
March  6  and  7,  the central  banks of France,  Germany,  Japan,  and 
the U.S.  all  lowered  their  discount  rates,  hoping  to stimulate 
global  growth  without upsetting  the  exchange-rate  realignment 
process.  On April  21 the  monetary  authorities  of Japan and the 
U.S. both lowered their  discount  rates again. 
•  Tokyo  summit  (May 4-5,  1986), The C-i heads  of  state set  up 
the  Group of  Seven Finance  Ministers  to  review  the  "mutual 
compatibility"  of members'  policies  between  the annual  summit 
meetings.  These  multilateral  surveillance  exercises,  to  be 
conducted  in  cooperation  with the  International  Monetary  Fund, 
were  to  censider  a  number  of "indicators's  of' economic  performance, 
Lncludirlg exchange  rates,  international reserves,  current-account 
and  trade  balances,  and fiscal  deficits.  The summit  declaration 
seemed to back  off a  bit from the more vigorous  interventionism  of 
the  Plaza announcement:  it  recommended  that  "remedial  efforts 
focus  first and foremost  on underlying  policy  fundamentals,"  and 
reaffirmed  the  1983  Williamsburg  summit commitment  "to  intervene in  exchange  markets  when  to do so would be  helpful. 
N First  meeting  of the  G-7  Finance Ministers  (September  27, 
1986). A  year  after the Plaza agreeeent,  the 6-7  Finance Ministers 
agreed that  mesbers  should adopt macroeconomic policies to reduce 
external  imbalances  to  sustainable  levels  "without  further 
significant  exchange  rate  adjustment."  In other words,  even though 
major  effects ef the exchange-rate realignment en current accounts 
remained  to  be  seen,  realignment  had  proceeded far enough over  the 
past  year  to  allow  countries  to  stabilize  currency  values. 
Nonetheless, between  October  1986  and  February 1987,  the  dollar 
depreciated  roughly  11.0 percent further  against  the mark and 5.5 
percent  further against  the yen.  (See figure  2,) 
N  Louvre  accord  (February  22,  1987).  The  0-7  finance 
ministers  and central  bank governors  (sans  Italy)  made  their 
strongest  statement  yet  on the  need to hold nominal  exchange 
rates near  existing  levels, but did  not  reveal  to the public exact 
reference  levels or allowable ranges  of  variation  around them: 
The  MInisters  and Governors  agreed that the substantial  exchange 
rate  changes  since  the  Plaza  Agreement  will  increasingly 
contribute  to reducing  external  imbalances  and have now brought 
their  currencies  within  ranges broadly  consistent  with underlying 
economic  fundamentals,  given  the  policy  commitments  summarized 
in this  statement.  Further  subsrantial exchange  rate shifts  among 
their  currencies  could  damage growth  and adjustment  prospects  in 
their  countries.  In current  circumstances,  therefore,  they agreed 
to cooperate  closely to foster stability  of exchange  rates around 
current  levels. 
The published  "policy  commitments"  included  a German  promise  of 
tax cuts,  Japanese  assurances of fiscal  stimulus  and  tax  reform, 
and a  U.S. pledge  to cut the federal deficit  to 2.3  percent  of  GNP 
in  1988.  According  to  Funabashi  (1988,  pp.  186-187),  the 
8 participants  also  agreed  to  spend  as  much  as  $4  billion 
intervening  over  the  period  ending  in  April.  Their  goal,  he 
reports,  was to stabilize  the mark and the yen  within  5 percent 
ranges of 1,8250  marks/dollar  and 153.50 yen/dollar,  respectively. 
Intervention  would occur 'on a voluntary  basis" within a  2.5 
percent  band of these  central  rates, was "expected  to intensify" 
between  the 2.5 and 5 percent  limits, and  would  be supplemented  by 
mandatory  "consultation  on policy  adjustment"  at  the  5  percent 
limit.  A  7 percent  appreciation  of the yen relative  to its  Louvre 
parity  was  however,  ratified  at a G-7 meeting in April 1987, 
where  it was agreed,  once  again,  that  "around  current  levels" 
member  currencies  "are  within  ranges  broadly  consistent  with 
economic  fundamentals  and the basic  policy  intentions  outlined  at 
the  Louvre  meeting.'  A  similar  favorable  assessment  of  the 
appropriateness  of current exchange-rate  levels was offered by the 
G-7  after  their  September  26,  1987  meeting.  This  last 
announcement,  however,  followed  nearly  six months  of relative 
stability  of  mutual  0-7 exchange  rates. 
The G-7 response  to the  stock-market  crash (December  22, 
1987).  After  the  stock-market  collapse  of October  19,  1987,  the 
dollar  depreciated  sharply  against  foreign  currencies.  The 
subsequent  G-7  communiqué  refrained  from  any direct  pronouncement 
on the appropriateness  of current  exchange-rate  levels. A  warning 
to the foreign  exchange markets  was, however,  issued: 
The  Ministers  and  Covernors  agreed  that  either  excessive 
fluctuation  of exchange  rates,  a further decline of  the dollar,  or 
a rise  in the  dollar  to an extent that becomes  destabilizing  to 
the  adjustment  process  could be  counterproductive  by damaging 
growth  prospects  in the  world economy.  They re-emphasized  their comison  interest  in  more  stable  exchange  rates  among  their 
currencies  and  agreed  tn  conrinue  to  enoperate  clnsely  in 
monitoring and  implementing  polities  to  strengthen  underlying 
economic  iundamentals  to  foster  stability  of exchange  rates.  In 
addition,  they agreed  to cooperate closely  on  exchange  markets. 
(This W5tOiO  was repeated,  in almost  identical  words,  after  the 
April lkii  G-7 meeting.)  The  communiqué  praised  the  period  ci 
exchange-rate  stability  from  the Louvre  to  the  September  G-7 
meeting,  as well es  "the basic  objectives  and economic  policy 
directions agreed  in  the  Louvre  Accord  Policy  pledges 
included  greater  fiscal  stimulus in  Germany,  continued  stimulus  in 
Japan.  and further  fiscal  consolidatIon  in tho U.S.5  This G-7 
declaration  followed  disappointing  news  on the U.S.  trade  deficit 
in the first bali of  December;  the declaration,  perhaps because  ci 
its  vagueness,  did  nothing  to dispel  the ensuing  selling  pressure 
on the  dollar, which only  abated  in  early  January  after  contorted 
LI 'erv..  re, a 0  .if 
'  'r'  e  r—red 
afterward 
10 months  of  relative  exchange-tate  stability,  the  seven  heads of 
stmte  repeated  the now-familiar  ban  on further dollar  depreciation 
or  "destabilizing"  appreciation.  Around  the  same time,  however, 
positive  news on the US, foreign deficit,  rising  dollar  interest 
rates, and official  remarks  seemingly favorable  to  the  possibility 
of some dollar  appreciation  set off  a two-month  slide of the mark 
and yen  against  the  dollar, 
t C-? Berlin  starement  (Seprember 24,  1988),  In the wake  of 
the  previous  summer's  dollar  appreciation,  the  participants 
endorsed  exchange-rate  stability  in  general  terms  but did not 
repeat  their  earlier  formula,  which  had  labelled  as 
"counterproductive"  any significant  change  in the dollar's  vslue, 
After the G-7 meeting,  however,  individual  statements  by  the C-S 
foreign  ministers  expressed  satisfaction  wirh  the  prevailing 
levels  of exchange  rates.  Their  assessment  contradicted  that  of 
the  IMP's  managing  director,  who,  in widely publicized  remarks, 
deplored  the  dollar's  appreciation  since the Toronto summit. 
Exchange-Rate  Fundamentals:  Monetary Policies 
In evaluating  the role played by pure intervention  in  recent 
years,  it is useful to have some perspective  on the behavior  of 
other  fundamental  determinants  of  exchange  rates,  and on the 
ability  of  these  fundamentals  to  explain  exchange-market 
developments.  Because  of the dlose link  between intervention  and 
monetary  policy,  a natural  focus  is an account  of money-market 
conditions  in Germany,  Japan,  and  the U.S.  In recent  years,  the 
often  erratic behavior  of money  demand and of individual  monetary 
11 aggregates  has made  it perilous  to use any one  as an  indicator  of 
the stance  of  monetary  policy.  Some  inferences  about  monetary 
tfghtness  can,  however,  he based  on the  behavior  of  short-term 
nominal  interest  rates.  In sticky-price  exchange-rate  models, 
these  rates tend to fall  (rise) in the short  run,  reinforcing  the 
home currency's  depreciation  (appreclaton),  when monetary  policy 
is  expansionary  (contractionary)  or  when  the  money  demand 
-  .  is  -  -  -  -  funotton sntfrs  downward  (upward,.  The  patti  in retytng  even  on 
short-term  nominal  interest  rates  as  indicators  of monetary  ease 
is, of course,  that these  rates are  influenced  by  other  factors, 
notably  the  price  level and output.  l'c  is therefore  advisable  to 
consider  additional relevant  information, when it is available,  in 
assessing  the stance  of  monetary policy. 
Figure  3  shows  short-term  nominal  interest  rates  on mark, 
yen,  and  dollar  deposits  since  1978;  interest  differentials 
(dollar  less mark  and dollar less yen) are  shown in figure  4.  The 
figures  suggest  thmt the foundation  for the downward  trend  of the 
dollar  after  the first  quarter  of 1985 wee  a  falling  trend  in 
dollat interest  rates  from  a  local  peak reached  eocy in  the 
muimaer  of  1914, As dollar  interest fell through  rho laro spring of 
1985,  yen  and  mark  interest  fluctuated  in  narrow  ranges. 
Accordingly,  the interest  differentisl in favor of  dollars  dropped 
Lisee  for  example,  Dornbusch  (1976). 
.  In  Dornbusch's  model, 
monetary  expansion  could  cause an immediate rise in the short-term 
nominal interest  rate if output  were  to respond  immediately  and 
strongly  to monetary  expansion.  This  possibility  does  not seem 
very relevant  to  the  three main industrial  countries:  central 
bankers  seem  confident  of  their  ability  to  lower  short-term 
interest  rates  in the short  run,  and some formal econometric  tests 
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 precipitously  over the period, Apparently behind  this drop was  a 
sharp  shift  in U.S.  monetary  policy:  as  dollar  interest  rates 
began  to fall, M2 growth, which  had  been in  the lower portion  of 
its  6'to-9  percent  1984  target  range,  jumped sufficiently  to 
finish the year  around  the top." In  addition,  the Federal Reserve 
made  1/2  percent  cuts in  its  discount  rate  in  November  and 
December  of 1984.  In subsequent  testimony before  Congress,  Fed 
Chairman  Paul  Volcker  included  the  disruptive  effects  of  the 
dollar's continuing strength among the factors that motivated  this 
easing  of  monetary policy.'5 
The effects  of looser money did not  show up immediately  in 
exchange  markets;  indeed,  during the  fall  of  1984,  the  dollar 
appreciated  against  the  mark and yen,  and  then  jumped  upward 
between  December  1984  and  February  1985  as  the  pace  of U.S. 
interest  rate  reduction  slowed  and  (in  February)  temporarily 
reversed. The dollar began to  decline from  its peak, however, as a 
renewed narrowing  of the interest  differentials favoring  dollars 
began  in  March.  Fueling this development was U.S. M2  growth around 
the  top of its  range,  another  1/2 percent  discount  rate  cut  in 
May,  and progress  on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  deficit  reduction 
legislation,  which President  Reagan  signed at the end of 1985. 
Falling  interest  rates  in Cermany probably  slowed,  but  did not 
11See  International  Monetary  Fund,  World  Economic Outlook,  April 
1988, chatt 19, p. 63. 
'2'Volcker's February 20, 1985 testimony before the Senate Committee 
on ganking, Housing,  and Urban  Affairs  is reproduced  in Federal 
Reserve Bulletin  71 (April 1985), pp.  211-221. 
13 prevent,  the dollar's very  sharp depreciation against the mark. 
A firming of  U.S. interest rates in  the summer of  1985 helped 
set the  stage  for  the  September dollar  rally  that preceded the 
Plazs  announcement.  The announcement  was  not  accompanied  by an 
immediate change in  international interest differentials;  however, 
it occasioned  an immediate  fall  in the  dollar,  even before any 
official  intervention  occurred.  The  exchange  markets'  response 
represented,  in  part,  a reassessment of the  likely permanence  of 
the expansionary monetary  tack  pursued by the Federal Reserve  in 
previous months. As an  official U.S. account put it: 
In  part,  the exchange market reaction  reflected the fact that the 
announcement was unexpected. More importantly, market participants 
noted that  the  initiative  had come from the  United  States  and 
viewed  it  as  a  change  in  the  U.S.  government's  previously 
perceived  attitude  of  accepting  or even welcoming  the  strong 
dollar, In  addition,  the agreement was interpreted  as eliminating 
the  likelihood  that  the  Federal  Reservo  would  tighten  reserve 
conditions  in response to  rapid U.S. monetary  growth.'3 
Faced with  upward  pressure on the yen,  the Bank of  Japan  pushed 
yen interest sharply higher  in October;  mark interest  rates  rose 
only slightly  in  that  month. Over the  course  of  1986,  dollar 
interest first rose, then  declined, and then rose relative  to yen 
interest,  while  falling  more or less  steadily  relative  to mark 
interest.  The  dollar's  depreciation  against  the  yen  from 
end-September  1985  to end-December 1986,  36.4 percent,  was  about 
the  same as its depreciation against  the mark,  37.6 percent,  in 
"See  "Treasury and Federal Reserve  Foreign  Exchange  Operations: 
Interim Report,"  Federal Reserve Bulletin  72 (February  1986),  p. 
110. 
14 contrast  to the  dollar's  greater  fall  vis-A--vis the mark in the 
months  before the  Plaza  agreement.  During  this  period,  U.S.  H2 
growth  remained  strong;  in  addition  to  the  coordinated 
discount-rate  cuts  mentioned  above, which brought  the U.S.  rate 
down  to 6.5 percent by the end of April,  the Fed carried out two 
unilateral 1/2 percent cuts in July and August. 
Already by mid-1986,  some policymakers  in the U.S.,  notably 
Chairman  Voicker,  and  many abroad, worried that  further  dollar 
depreciation might  have adverse effects on U.S.  inflation and on 
the  world  economy.  In  September,  the  C-i  issued  the 
above-mentioned  declaration  that current exchange-rate levels were 
broadly  consistent  with "fundamentals." On October  31,  1986,  the 
U.S.  Treasury secretary, James A. Baker, and the Japanese finance 
minister,  Kiichi  Miyazawa,  reiterated  that  "the  exchange  rate 
realignment  achieved  between  the yen  and the  dollar  since  the 
Plaza  Agreement  is  now broadly  consistent  with the  underlying 
fundamentals...."  The  Bank of Japan  cut  its  discount  rate,  and 
Miyazawa  pledged to  stimulate the Japanese economy further through 
tax  reform  and  additional  public  spending.14  In  November, 
short-term dollar  interest rates began to  edge upward. 
Disappointing  news on the U.S. trade  balance,  disappointing 
implementation  of  the  Japanese  fiscal  undertakings  in  the 
Baker-Miyazawa  accord,  and  hints  from U.S.  officials  that  the 
dollar  might  need to depreciate  further led to a renewed bout of 
dollar  weakness  in December  and January. On  January 21, Baker and 
'4Funabashi (1988, pp. 274-275). 
15 Niyazawa  issued  a second  communiqué characterizing  the dollar-yen 
rate  as "broadly consistent  with fundamentals,"  despite a dollar 
depreciation  against  the yen  of close  to 6  percent  since  the 
earlier  Baker-Miyazawa  declaration.'5 In  subsequent  attempts  to 
relieve  the  upward  pressure on their  currencies,  the Bundesbank 
and the Bank of  Japan lowered their discount rates, reinforcing an 
ongoing  widening  of  the  dollar's  interest  advantage.  The 
Bundesbank's  action  followed a year in  which, partly  as a result 
of  interventions  connected  with  European  Monetary  System  (EMS) 
pressures,  partly  as  a  result  of  dollar  interventions,  the 
central-bank  money  stock  had finished  far above  the  top  of its 
target range.  (The mark  was revalued  within  the EMS on January  12, 
1987.) The Louvre accord,  the first concerted attempt to stabilize 
currency  values  since  the  dollar  turnaround  of early  1985,  was 
announced on  February 22, 1987. 
The Louvre  accord resulted in a period, about  eight  months 
long,  of  approximate  stability  for  the main industrial-country 
exchange  rates.  This broad stabilization  was  achieved  despite 
continuing pressure  for further dollar depreciation due,  in  part, 
to the persistence of a large  U.S. current-account  deficit.  The 
dollar-mark  exchange  rate basically remained  within  a 5  percent 
band during this  period,  while  the  dollar-yen  rate  fluctuated 
'5Funabashi (1988, pp. 161-163) suggests that Japanese  authorities 
manipulated  the Tokyo  foreign exchange market to bring  about  the 
yen depreciation  that occurred  between  the  conclusion  of  the 
first Baker-Miyazawa deal  in  September 1986 and its announcement a 
month later. 
16 within a 10 percent band.  The dollar exchange  rates of the pound 
sterling, the French franc, the Canadian dollar, and the lira  were 
also unusually stable. 
It  seems  apparent  in  retrospect  that  the  relative 
exchange-rate  stability  that  followed  the  Louvre  meeting  was 
enforced with the help of  restrictive monetary policy  in the U.S. 
and  relatively  expansionary  policies  in  Germany  and  Japan. 
Short-term  mark and yen interest rates moved  downward  after  the 
Louvre,  remaining  near,  and  mostly  below,  4  percent  until 
September 1987. Germany's  central-bank money  stock was allowed to 
overshoot  its  1987  target  growth  range of 3  to 6  percent  by a 
considerable margin;  as a result, German Ml and M3 both grew at 
exceptionally  rapid  rates  over  the  year.  Japan's  money 
supply-  -whether  measured as Ml  or  as  M2  plus  the  stock  of 
certificates  of deposit- 
-  grew  at  its  fastest  rate of the decade 
(in both cases  well above  10 percent  per  year).  In the  U.S., 
meanwhile,  short-term  interest rates moved to a higher  range and 
the growth  rate of M2 was held below  the  bottom  of its  target 
interval;'8 in early  September  the Fed raised its discount  rate 
'6lnternational Monetary  Fund,  op. cit.  The  money  growth  rates 
cited in  this paragraph are changes in annual averages (table A14, 
p.  125).  Since  the  October  1987  stock-market crash  caused some 
easing  of  monetary  policies,  a  measure  of  money  growth  more 
relevant  for assessing  the domestic-policy  impact of the Louvre 
agreement  may be the growth rate of  money  for the year ending in 
September  1987.  (A year-long  interval  is chosen  to correct  for 
money-supply  seasonality.)  From  end-September  1986  through  the 
same time in 1987, growth rates of  Japan's monetary aggregates and 
of German  Ml  are not very  different from the figures in  the text; 
growth of German  M3 is 6.4 percent, which is,  however, higher than 
the  upper  limit  for  1988  M3  growth  (6  percent)  set  by  the 
Bundesbank  in  January of  that year. 
17 from  5.5 to  6 percent. 
Interest-rate  increases  in  all  three  countries,  and  a 
widening  of  the  U.S.  -foreign short-term  interest  differential, 
preceded  the  stock-market  crash  of  October  19,  1987.  This 
generalized  rice  in interest rates  is sometimes  identified  as  a 
catalyst  of the crash. The stock-market  plunge  was  immediately 
followed  by a  worldwide  fail  in  interest  rates  as  investors 
shifted from stocks  into bonds  and  as  central banks  acted to head 
off any incipient liquidity crisis; in the process,  the  interest 
differential  in favor  of dollars declined.  gy the  end  of 1987, 
the  dollar  had  registered  another  decisive  external  decline, 
shattering  the  lower  limit specified  by the  Louvre  accord.  The 
dollar's  fall was heavily  influenced by adverse  U.S. trade  news, 
and it occurred  in spite  of an interest-rate  reduction  in Japan 
and sn even  deeper  reduction in  Europe. The December 0-7 meeting, 
as noted earlier, reaffirmed the goal of exchange-rate  stability 
and  warned against  further  dollar  depreciation,  to  no  great 
immediate effect. 
After  the  dollar,  buttressed  by  favorable  trade  news 
and more intervention,  recovered some  of its losses  in  January, 
the  currency's  exchenge  rates  against  the  yen  end  the  mark 
remained  in  relatively  narrow  bands  through  the  middle  of 
June--another  period,  nearly  six  months  long,  of  approximate 
stability.  A  new  phase  of  dollar  appreciation  began  after 
mid-June,  sparked,  as  noted  above,  by  evidence  of  U.S. 
trade-balance  improvement,  firming  doller  interest  rates,  end 
official  intiaations  that some dollar  appreciation  might  now be 
18 tolerated.  The surprising  magnitude and duration  of the dollar's 
summer-time rise raised  the worrisome possibility  that progress  in 
external  adjustment  might  be  slowed  or  even  reversed  By 
September, however,  the dollar  upswstng had moderated with  the aid 
of  sharply higher  short-term interest rates in  Germany. 
Exchange-Rate Fundamentals:  Government and Private Demand 
A brief look  at  events  impinging more  directly  than monetary 
policy  on  output  markets  will  complete  this  survey  of 
macroeconomic  developments  in the recent period  of exchange-rate 
realignment.  Table  1 reports  data  on central-government  fiscal 
deficits  (general-government  deficits are  given  in parentheses) 
and real domestic demand  growth in the three largest economies.'7 
Important  changes  in  fiscal  positions  are  evident  in  the 
data.  Over  the  course  of  the  early  1980s,  U.S.  government 
deficits--central and general alike--rose sharply relative to GNP; 
starting  in 1986,  a leveling-off and  possible  reversal  of  this 
trend appears.  Both Germany and Japan, however,  display declining 
deficit  ratios  over the  early  1980s.  In the  German  case,  this 
'7Domestic demand is the sum of domestic consumption  and investment 
demand,  both private  end  public.  Domestic  demand growth  ratper 
than output growth  is reported because  the former  variable  is a 
more  direct  measure  of  pressure  on the  exchange  rate,  in the 
Mundell-Fleming  model,  for example, an  increase in  domestic demand 
can cause  ths home currency to  appreciate even though output  does 
not change. (See Mundell 1968; a more recent  analytical discussion 
of  the  effects  of  demand  factors on real  and  nominal  exchange 
rates  is in Obstfeld  1985.)  The movements  in government  deficits 
reported  above,  though not cyclically or inflation  adjusted,  are 
broadly  consistent  (in recent  years) with changes  in  the  IMF's 
fIscal impulse measures. 
19 Table 1 
Fiscal  Policy and Domestic  Demand  in Japan,  Germany,  and  the 
United  States,  1980-1988 
Central (General) Government Fiscal a1ance 
(Percent of nominal GNP/CDP) 
Germany  Japan  United  States 
1980  -1.9  (-2.9)  -6.2  (-4.4)  -2.3  (-1.3) 
1981  -2.5  (-3.7)  -5.9  (-3.8)  -2.4  (-1.0) 
1982  -2.4  (-3.3)  -5.9  (-3.6)  -4,1  (-3.5) 
1983  -1.9  (-2.5)  -5.6  (-3,7)  -5.6  (-3.8) 
1984  -1.6  (-1.9)  -4.7  (-2.1)  -5.1  (-2.8) 
1985  -1.3  (-1.1)  -3.9  (-0.8)  -5.3  (-3.3) 
1986  -1.2  (-1.2)  -3.6  (-1.1)  -4.8  (-3.4) 
1987  -1.4  (-1.7)  -3.3  (-0.4)  -3.3  (-2.3) 
1988  -1.8  (-2.1)  -2.5  (-0.1)  -3.1  (-2.2) 
Annual  Growth  of  Total Real  Domestic Demand 
(Percent) 
Germany  Japan  United  States 
1980  1.1  0.8  -1.8 
1981  -2.6  2.2  2.2 
1982  -2.0  2.8  -1.9 
1983  2.3  1.8  5.1 
1984  2.0  3.8  8.7 
1985  0.8  3.9  3,8 
1986  3.5  4.0  3.7 
1987  3.1  5.1.  3.0 
1988  3.2  7.4  3.0 
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund,  World  Economic  Outlook, 
October  1988,  tables  A13,  A17,  and  A2.  Figures  for  1988  are 
IMF staff projections. downward  trend  seems  to  end  in  1985-86, while  in  the Japanese 
case,  the  trend  continues  through  the  time  of  writing.  These 
changes in the three countries'  internal public  deficits over the 
decade  correlate  reasonably  well with  the  changes  in  their 
external deficits. 
In retrospect,  the  stabilizing  of the  American  and  German 
fiscal  deficit  ratios  around  the  mid-l980s stands  out as a  key 
factor behind  the dollar-mark  realignment  that began late  in the 
first  quarter  of  1985.  Although  Japan's  fiscal  deficits  have 
continued  to  decline  throughout  the  l980s,  U.S.  fiscal 
consolidation has promoted  dollar-yen realignment as well. Before 
1985,  market participants  may have  expected  the  then-divergent 
trends in national  fiscal  positions  to continue  for  some  time; 
these  expectations  would  have  contributed,  in  turn,  to  the 
dollar's  appreciation against  the mark and yen.  Thus,  the impact 
of  fiscal policy  on  exchange rates in the late l980s should not be 
judged  by the  sizes  of actual  fiscal adjustments  alone. To the 
extent that fiscal policy  actions from 1985  on signalled changes 
in the  trends of the decade's  first half,  they would  have been 
accompanied by changes in  expected future deficit ratios that have 
an effect on exchange rates  independent of current  fiscal  moves. 
Rranson (1988) has insisted on the importance of  such expectations 
effects  in  arguing  that  the  anticipated  enactment  of  the 
Grasss-Rudman-Hollings  legislation contributed to the dollars 1985 
depreciation. 
Lacking  the benefits  of hindsight, market  participants  were 
able to  discern changes in  national fiscal  trends only  over time. 
20 A growing  perception  that American  end German  fiacel  trends  had 
been altered probably  contributed  to steady downward  pressure  on 
the dollar  relative to the aark and yen  after 1985. 
Given  the  likely  importance  of fiscal-policy  expectations, 
little can be  gained  from attempts to correlate even year-to-year 
movements  in  currency  values  with ex  post  changes  in  fiscal 
stance. Possibly, more can be  learned from divergent movements  in 
real  domestic  demand, which  are  less  likely than fiscal-deficit 
changes  to have  been associated with large  shifts  in long-term 
expectations, It is difficult in  practice, however, to disentangle 
the  "pure"  exchange-rate  effect of a demand  shift--which  alters 
the  terms  of  trade  at  constant  money  price  levels--from  the 
expectations about future monetary policy reactions that the shift 
creates.  Thus,  an acceleration of demand  growth  in the U.S.  can 
cause neminal dollar  appreciation for two reaaona: it signals the 
pceaible  neec.  far  a  time in the  racetive  price  cc  J,, traded 
gccda, end  if the  eccnony ia running  near  full capacity, it alac 
tarmac  the  Lrkzetrnccci  Gnat  tne  red  wail.  rartrict nc'necary  grcwth 
in the  future, 
S-inca  1985,  cumulative  denend  grce.n  baa  been  atrongeet  in 
Japan;  fran 1988  denac.d  grcwth  baa  heec  cc-epeiable  in  the  U. S 
and  Gerneny.  Overall  demand  factors  are  therefore  likely 
concributora to the  yen's appreciation  against  both  the dollar and 
the  mark.  The extremely high rate of  U.S. demand  growth in 1984 
(8.7  percent)  is noteworthy. A plausible  hypothesis  is that  the 
buoyant  business  enwironnient  associated  with  this  exceptional 
growth, perhaps coupled with  expectations that monetary  tightness 
21 would  be needed  later  to discourage  inflation,  kept  the dollar 
high  in  1984  and  early  1985  even  after  U.S.  monetary  policy 
loosened. 
II. Sterilized  Intervention as a Policy Instrument 
After  1985.  monetary  policies  in the  three  main industrial 
countries  have  operated  in  a  setting  of  relatively  inflexible 
fiscal  policies,  first to amplify the dollar's  teal depreciation 
in  the  hope  of hastening  current-account  adjustment,  then  to 
stabilize currencies at  levels supposedly consistent with  external 
equilibrium  in the  long run. At the  same  time, each country has 
used monetary  means  to pursue  the additional,  domestic,  goal  of 
growth  with  low inflation. Iii a world of  N countries and  N policy 
tools (the individual countries' monetary policies),  it is only  by 
accident that N  domestic objectives and N-l exchange  rate targets 
can  be  simultaneously  attained.  Unless  N-l  additional  policy 
instruments are available, conflicts between internal and  external 
balance  are  bound to arise,  as  they  have  done  continually  in 
recent years. 
Sterilized  foreign-exchange  intervention  furnishes  N-I 
additional  policy  tools  with  the  potential  to  be  useful 
complements  to  monetary  policies. These N-l additional  tools are 
pure  changes  in the  relative  stocks of national-currency  bonds 
held in  private  portfolios.  A major  difficulty  in  evaluating 
intervention  is  to  identify  empirically  the  channels,  if any, 
through  which intervention  has  mignficant,  lasting  effects  on 
exchange rates. 
22 The Mechanics of  Intervention and Sterilization 
Offioial  intervention in  the foreign exchenge market  has tho 
direot  effect of altering  the balance  sheet of the central bank, 
and  possihly  of  other  government  agencies.  United  States 
intervention,  for  example,  is  carried  out  by both the  Federal 
Reserve  and by the Exchange Stabilization Fund  (ESF)  of the US. 
Treasury. 
Wnen  foreign exchange intervention is not sterilized,  it can 
affect  exchange  rates by changing the  stock of high powered  (or 
base)  money,  a  change  that  leads  to  adjustments  in  broader 
monetary aggregates, in  interest rates, and in  market expectations 
about  future price-level  inflation. A stylized balance  sheet  for 
the  German  Bundesbank  would  show  its  net  asset 
holdinga  -consisting of net foreign assets  (UFA) and net dorestic 
assets  (NDA)--equei  cc  its  monetary  liabilities,  the  Gerren 
monetary bese (B):° 
NBA  NBA  B. 
A nonsterilized  Bundesbenk  purchase of a $1 million  dollar bank 
deposit at PM  2 per dollar, say,  alters the central bank's  balance 
sheet by raising NFA  (on the asset  aide) and B (on the liability 
side),  both by DM  2  million.  The corresponding  change  in the 
private sector's balance sheet is the mirror image of this one: a 
18central-banlc  net worth  is ignored for simplicity  of exposition. 
See Adams  and Henderson  (19B3)  for a more derailed discussion  of 
intervention  practices.  Kenen  (19BB,  chapter  5)  discusses  some 
asymmetries in  currenr intervention arrangements. DM 2 million  rise in  German high-powered money  holdings,  and a DM 
2 millIon decline in holdings of  dollar deposits. 
The  Bundesbank  could  sterilize  this  intervention's 
expansionary  effect on  the monetary base through several types of 
offsetting operation,  for example, a DM 2 million open-market  sale 
of  mark-denominated  domestic  government  securities.  This 
additional  operation  would reduce  the Bundesbank's  net  domestic 
assets  and its monetary  liabilities, both by OM 2 million. Taken 
together,  the  two  Bundesbank  actions--intervention  plus 
sterilization- -would  leave  the public with unchanged  holdings  of 
high-powered  money,  but with a higher  stock  of interest-bearing 
mark assets and a correspondingly  lower stock of interest bearing 
dollar assets.  In  this sense, sterilized intervention  is a 'pure" 
change in the relative  stocks of  national-currency bonds  held  by 
the public,  that is,  a change that is not accompanied by a change 
in  the monetary base.'9 
As noted above, sterilized interventions can take many  forms. 
Consider,  for  example,  a  hypothetical  forward  exchange  market 
intervention  in which  the  Bundesbank  sells  three-month  forward 
marks  for forward dollars. This operation is essentially  the same 
as  the  sterilized  intervention  just  described,  in  that  it 
'9My discussion  draws  a perhaps  artificially. sharp  distinction 
between  "money" and "bonds," and lumps all interest bearing assets 
together  under  the  latter  category.  As  a  practical  matter, 
fiancial  authorities  have  available  a rich menu of  financial 
operations,  across  liquidity  categories,  maturities,  and 
currencies.  I  judge an intervention to be sterilized  when it has 
no effect  on  the monetary base, defined as the stock of  reservable 
central-bank  liabilities,  including currency;  and I exclude  from 
the  definition  of "bonds"  any  interest-bearing  reserves  of the 
domestic banking system held  at the  central bank. 
24 increases the net stock  of  mark bonds held  by the private  sector 
(the private  sector's  net claims  on future  delivery  of marks), 
decreases the net stock  of  dollar bonds, but does rot change  the 
German  base.2° Operations by  non-central bank  government  agencies, 
such  as the United  States ESF,  are automatically sterilized  if the 
balances  drawn  on  for  intervention  purposes  are  held  in  the 
private  banking  system,  say,  or  in  the  form  of  government 
securities purchased  and sold in  the open market. If  some of  these 
balances  are  held  at  central  banks,  however,  the  agencies' 
interventions may have monetary effects. 
Certain  central-bank  transactions  are  automatically 
sterilized, after  some time lag.  Imagine that the Bundesbank lends 
DM  1  million  to  the  Bank of  France  for  intramarginal  franc 
purchases under  the EMS very short-term financing  facility. At an 
exchange rate  of Ffr 3.5 per mark, say, these transactions  change 
the two central banks' balance sheets as  follows: 
Balance Sheet of  the Bundesbank 
Change in  Net Assets  Change in  Monetary Liabilities 
ANFA  — +  DM  1 million  B.B — +  ON  1 million 
leave maturity  issues aside for the purpose of  this example. 
25 Balance Sheet of the  Bank  of France 
Change  in  Net Assets  Change in  Monetary Liabilities 
NFA  —  — Ffr 3.5 million  B  =  —  Ffr  3.5 million 
As a result of this  coordinated  intervention, there is  a symmetric 
monetary adjustment  (absent  immediate  sterilization),  because 
Germany's  high-powered  money  stock rises as France's falls, tinder 
EMS  rules,  however,  the  increase  in  German  money  may  be 
automatically  sterilized  if,  after the statutory  three and a half 
months,  the Bundesbank  requests repayment  of  its loan  in marks. 
Since  repayment  leaves  the  French  central  bank's  net  foreign 
assets  the same-  -a liability to the  tundesbank  is settled through 
an equal  depletion  of mark reserves-  -  the  French  monetary  base 
remains  at its lower  level.  The German  base  falls,  however,  if 
the  Bank  of  France  discharges  its  debt to  the  Bundeabank  by 
drawing on French  official holdings of  marketable  mark  securities: 
Balance Sheet of  the Bundesbank 
Change in  Net Assets  Change in  Monetary  Liabilities 
NFA  — —  DM  1 million  LiP, — —  DM  1 million 
In  effect,  the  Bank  of  France  automatically  sterilizes  the 
increase  in  the  German base  when  it  repays  its  loan using 
26 marketable  mark  reserves; the initial symmetry ef the intervention 
unwinds.  Such automatir  sterilization  would  not ocrur  if France 
21 
repaid Germany in  dollars or in  European Currency Untts,  say. 
International Portfolio Balance and Exchange Rates 
Since  sterilized  intervention  operates  by  changing 
the  currency denomination  of bonds  held by  the  public,  such 
changes must  affect  asset-market equilibrium if any exchange-rate 
change  is  to result,  As a  isatcer  of theory,  the  link  between 
government  asset  swaps  and  equilibrium  is  not  iaaediate:  a 
government  exchange of foreign for domestic assets with domestic 
residents may  wash  out if private agents fully capitalize, as part 
of  their  own  wealth,  all  future  net  taxes  levied  by  the 
governmenc.  In  this extreme case of Ricardian equivalence  becween 
debt issue and taxes,  the government csnnot  aystemacically  affect 
the relevant  "outside" bond supplies, that  is the net  supply of 
claims on governments  that  the public must  hold.  The evidence on 
Ricardian  equivalence  is ambiguous,  so in what follows,  I will 
assume  that government  asset  operations  do  indeed  move  outside 
asset supplies  in the intended directions,  though not necesssrily 
2tFor  simplicity,  this  example  has  abstracted  entirely  from 
interest payments. Of course, the intervention's effects would be 
reversed entirely if the Bank of France went  to the open  market  to 
purchase the needed marks with high-powered francs. 
27 on  a one-for-one basis.22 
How should  changes  in outside supplies  of national-currency 
debt  affect  asset  markets?  Portfolio-balance  theories  of 
exchange-rate  determination  link  relative expected  nominal  rates 
of return on bonds of different currency denomination  to outside 
asset  supplies. According  to  these theories, a wealth  owner cares 
about the riskiness  of a portfolio as well  as the expected  return 
that it offers. Since bonds of  different currency denomination are 
perfect  substitutes  for  risk  averters  only  under very unlikely 
circumstances,  a change  in outside asset supplies generally alters 
the risk characteristics  of  the market portfolio  and thus requires 
an  equilibrating  adjustment  in  currencies'  relative  expected 
returns  - 
More  precisely,  let  be the one-period  risk-free  nominal 
interest rate on domestic currency,  the corresponding  rate  on 
foreign currency, S 
the (spot) price of  foreign currency in  terms 
22Pure  intervention has no effect on exchange rates  in a Ricardian 
setting  for the same reason  that private firms'  decisions  on the 
currency  of denomination  of their borrowing  may have no effect. 
(See  the chapter  by Froot  in this volume.)  Stockman  (1979)  and 
Obatfeld  (1982) discuss the relation between Ricardian  equivalence 
and intervention effects.  As illustrated  in those  papers, and as 
stressed more  recently by  Backus and Kehoe  (1988), the analysis of 
intervention cannot  be conducted independently  of an analysis of 
the  resulting  effects  on the  government's  intertemporal  budget 
constraint.  Thus,  if  pure  intervention  disturbs  asset-market 
equilibrium  because  taxes  are  distorting,  the  effect  of 
intervention would  depend heavily on  which taxes  (if any) need  to 
be adjusted afterward to ensure government solvency. In principle, 
it is easy to imagine that a given intervention could have a wide 
variety  of  effects,  depending  on  how  its  budgetary  impact  is 
accommodated.  (The same point naturally applies to the evaluation 
of any  other  policy.)  Section  III below  discusess  the  linkage 
between  intervention  and government  budget  constraints  from  the 
perspective of  policy credibility. 
28 of  domestic,  and  E(.)  a  conditional  expectation,  given 
information as of date t.  Then  the domestic-currency  payoff  on a 
domestic-currency  bond  held for one period  is I + Rt while  the 
expected  domestic-currency  payoff on  the  same investment  in a 
one-period  foreign  bond  is  (1  +  R)E(S+1)/S.  The 
portfolio-balance  view posits  that  the  return  differential  or 
(relative) risk  premium on  foreign  currency, 
* 
(1)  (1 + 
Rt)E(St+1)/S 
-  (1 + 
is a function  of the  outside supplies  of assets  denominated  in 
domestic and foreign currency. An implication  is that changes  in 
outside  asset  supplies,  such  as  those  caused by  sterilized 
intervention,  can alter  asset-market  prices,  including  exchange 
rates.  The  general  presumption  is  that,  all  else  equal,  an 
incremse  in the stock  of domestic-currency debt that the  public 
must hold will raise  the domestic-currency  interest  rate,  lower 
the  foreign-currency  interest rate,  and depreciate  the domestic 
currency  in the  foreign  exchange market.  Branson  and  Henderson 
(1985) provide a  complete survey of  portfolio-based  approaches. 
There  is  a  large  body  of  evidence  contradicting  the 
hypothesis  that  in (I)  is identically  zero,  or even constant 
over time;  Hodrick  (1987)  presents  a  thorough  review  of  this 
evidence,  and of its interpretation by various authors. The  risk 
premium  could  be  identically  zero  if  investors  were  risk 
neutral  (and certain  other conditions held); in this case, bonds 
differing  in  currency  of  denomination  would  be  perfect 
substitutes,  implying  that  changes  in  their  relative  outside 
29 supplies  do  not  necessarily  call  for  equilibrating  changes  in 
relative  asset  returns.  Under  perfect substitution,  there  is no 
meaningful  distinction  (leaving  aside  the  incentive  effects 
to be discussed  in  section  III) between monetary  changes  brought 
about by transactions  in foreign exchange markets  and changes  of 
equal  magnitude  brought  about  by measures  such  as open-market 
trades  of domestic  securities.  The  condition p  0 is  often 
called  the uncovered  interest parity condition.ZS 
The statement that  uncovered  interest parity  fails to hold  is 
not the  same  as  the  statement  that  sterilized  intervention  is 
effective.2  The latter  statement would be supported,  however, by 
23Engel  and  Flood  (1985,  p.  314)  argue  that "certain  types  of 
sterilized  intervention can be effective in temporarily  altering 
exchange  rates,  even  in  the  presence  of  uncovered  interest 
parity." They  give as an example a (nonsterilized) sale of foreign 
bonds  by  the  central  bank,  accompanied by a  temporary  rise  in 
monetary  transfer  payments  that  holds the money supply  constant 
and simultaneoLsly  raises private net wealth at the initial money 
price  level.  A key feature of this  policy  package  is, however, 
the  fiscal  policy change  that  accompanies  the  central  bank's 
foreign-exchange  intervention. It is not surprising  that a fiscal 
change  accompanied  by  a  nonsterilized  intervention  disturbs 
equilibrium,  even when the money  supply  remains  constant  as  a 
result of  the combined policy actions. 
2The  implication  of Ricardian  equivalence,  that  the  government 
does not change outside asset supplies when it conducts sterilized 
intervention, has already been  mentioned. Backus  and Kehos  (1988), 
in a non-Ricardian model with risk-averse investors, present other 
examples of  sterilized  interventions that have  no  effects. Suppose 
that the dollar.mark  rate  will be $S(w) per mark next period  if 
the  state  of  nature  ca  occurs,  and  imagine  two  bonds  with 
respective payoffs of DM  I and $S(w)  in  state ca,  and with  a common 
payoff of zero in other  states.  These  securities  are  perfect 
substitutes  because  they  have the same  payoff in every  state  of 
nature;  intervention  operations  that  change  their  relative 
supplies  thus  have no  effects,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
bonds'  face values  differ in  currency of denomination.  Backus and 
Kehoe present further examples, all of  which involve operations  in 
securities  which are  perfect  substitues  (despite  private  risk 
30 econometric  evidence  that  government  debt  supplies  play  a 
systematic  role in  determining p. Evidence of  this aort has not, 
however, been  forthcoming. Define 
(1 + R)[S+1 
- 
so  that  is  uncorrelated with time-c information. Most  studies 
proceed  by  regressing 
* 
(2)  (1 + R)51/S 
-  (I + R)  p  + 
on  time-c  government  debt  supplies,  which  are  assumed  to be 
correlated  wich  che  relevant  outside  asset  supplies.  1-lodrick 
(1987, pp. 119-128) documents the  failure of  such tests co  produce 
significant  evidence  chat  asset  supplies  affecc  risk premiums. 
Some of the tests discussed by  1-lodrick impose added structure 
on  the  problem of  relating  the  cx  post  excess  recurn  (2)  to 
outside  asset  supplies  by assuming that international  investors 
are mean-variance  optimizers. The resulting capital-asset  pricing 
model  (CAPM)  implies  that  the  coefficient  in  the  regression 
equation  depends  on  the degree of investor risk aversion and cbs 
covsrisnce  matrix  of unexpected  asset  returns,  which  is assumed 
not to change over  time. Evidence that the covariance matrix  does 
indeed  change over time  (see Cumby  and Obstfeld,  1984) hss led 
some researchers  to postulate explicitly  time-varying  covsrisnce 
aversion)  because  of  their  identical  state-contingent  payoffs. 
These examples  sre of limited practical  relevance  for evslusting 
sterilized  intervention, since the securities traded  in reality do 
not have identical payoffs scross states of nature, and therefore 
are not generally perfect substitutes for investors. 
31 matrices  in  estimation.  Engel and  Rodrigues  (198]), Giovannini  and 
Jorion  (1989), and Mark (1988) take this approach;  the first  two 
papers  find  evidence  against  versions  of  the  CAPM  with 
time-varying  covariances,  while  the  last  is more favorable.  It 
seems fair to  say, however, that  none of these models can explain 
more  than  a small  fraction of  the volatility in the ex  post excess 
return (2). Allowing  for time-varying covariances in  the CAPM does 
little  if anything  to support  the view that  shifts  in outside 
asset supplies, per se, have significant exchange-rate  effects! 
Consumption-Based  Asset Pricing Models 
An alternative  approach  to modelling  the risk premium views 
consumption risk as a major determinant of  asset  returns. On this 
view, the mechanisma  that might underlie any  effects of  sterilized 
intervention  are  somewhat  less  direct  than  those  driving 
portfolio-balance  models.  Presumably,  sterilized  intervention 
could affect exchange rates by altering the composition of  private 
wealth,  and thereby altering  the covariance of wealth,  and hence 
of  consumption, with  the returns on  various currencies. 
The  consumption-based  theory  builds  on  the  intertemporal 
efficiency  condition  for an individual who derives utility u(c) 
from  consuming c  in  period  t, has a  subjective  discount factor fi, 
and  faces the home  price level  in addition to home  and foreign 
nominal  interest  rates  and  and a nominal  price  of foreign 
25The  work just reviewed  relies  on  some  version  of  the  ARCH 
specification proposed  by Engle  (1982)  to  model  time variation  in 
covariances.  Pagan  and Hong (1988) question  the  adequacy of the 
ARCH specification  on  empirical grounds. 
32 currency S. The efficiency  condition is 
l+R  Cov(Q  S  /S)  t  t  t+l  t+l  t 
(3)  E(S+i/S) 
—  *  I + R 
where 
t+l  (c+1)/P+1 
u' (c)/P 
and  Cov(.)  is  a  conditional  covariance.26  The  term on  the 
right-hand  side  of  (3)  is proportional  to  the  risk premium 
defined  in  (1);  if  it  is  identically  zero,  equation  (3) 
becomes  the uncovered  interest parity condition 
1 +R 
(4)  - 
1 + 
As noted earlier,  condition  (4)  has been tested extensively, 
for example,  by testing whether the  interest-factor  ratio  is an 
unbiased predictor  of future spot  rate  changes.  Table  2 presents 
estimates of the  equation 
St 1/Se 
a +  b(l + R)/(1 + R) + 
along with  F-tests of  the null hypothesis  of unbiasedness,  a — 0, 
b —  1. (The  time  interval  is  three  months,  and  the  data are 
nonoverlapping.)  Included are  results for the exchange  rates  of 
the mark,  the yen, and the pound sterling against the dollar. The 
results  are  rather  negative,  and  indicate  that  interest-rate 
26See  Hodrick  (1987) for a derivation. 
33 Table 2* 
Tests Based on S1/S 
— a  + b(l + R)/(1 + R)  + 
Currency  a  b  Q(18)  F-stat  Significance 
Mark  2383  -1.364  15.76  1.036  .363 
(1.742)  (1.726) 
Yen  4.013  -2.967  19.43  6.333  .004 
(1.152)  (1.141) 
Pound  2.289  -1.304  32.74  3.165  .052 
(0.935)  (0.939) 
*Quarterly  data, three-month interest rates, Exchange and interest 
rates are end-of-quarter quotations.  Sample period for yen is 76:2 
to 86:3; for other currencies,  75:2 to  86:3. The Q.statistic  tests 
for serial correlation at lags up to 18 and is distributed x2(18) 
if  equation errors are white noise. The F-statistic  tests the null 
hypothesis  a — 0,  b — 1. Its significance  is the probability  of 
finding the estimated coefficients under the null. differences  have tended  to mispredict the direction of subsequent 
exchange-rate change in  recent years. 
To asaeaa  the possibility  that  the results  of table  2 are 
explained by a time-varying consumption-based risk  premium,  it is 
useful to  write  (3) in s fora that is comparable  to (4). This can 
be done by observing  that E(Q+i) 
+ R)  l,  which  implies 
1 +R 
(5)  — Et[(St+l/St)Qt+1(l 
+ Rt)J.  I + Rt 
Equation  (5)  shows  how  depreciation,  adjusted  for  consumption 
risk,  is related  to the international interest differential.  The 
prediction  of this  equation  is rhat the ordinary  least  squares 
regression  + R) 
— a + bU + R)/(l 
+ R)  + t+l 
should yield  estimated  coefficients of a  0 and b  1;  table  3 
reports the results of  empirical  tests. For the purpose of these 
tests, it  was assumed that (I)  utility is separable in consumption 
of services,  nondurables,  and dursbles;  (2)  the utility  derived 
from any consumption  category can be measured by a function that 
is isoelastic with  elasticity 2 (so that  u' (c)  is a constant times 
-2  27  c  ); and (3  — 0.985  (per quarter). 
While  the  results of thsble 3 do make the  consumption-based 
model  look  marginally  better  than rhe simple  uncovered  interest 
27Consumption  of  dursbles  is  not  considered  in  rhe  tests  for 
reasons outlined  by Grossman  and baroque  (1987). Because of the 
deseasonslization  I  performed  in  constructing  the 
consumption-adjusted  depreciation  series  used in  table  3,  the 
reported  standard  errors  are  subject  to  a  (hopefully  minor) 
asymptotic inconsistency.  See the data  appendix  for a description 
of  the seasonal-adjustment procedure used. 
34 Table 3* 
Tests Based on (S  i/St)Qt+i(l+Rt) 
— a  + b(l+R)/(l+R) 
+ 
Currency  a  b  Q(18)  F-stat  Significance 
Consumption Data: Services 
Mark  -0.347  1.325  14.97  1.992  .148 
(1.855)  (1.837) 
Yen  2.585  -1.567  15.81  2.571  .089 
(1.208)  (1.196) 
Pound  0.963  0.014  30.73  2.699  .078 
(1.071)  (1.076) 
Consumption  Data: Nondurables 
D-mark  0.804  0.193  14.40  0.792  .459 
(1,817)  (1.780) 
Yen  3.069  -2.03/  17.80  2.542  .091 
(1.365)  (1.352) 
Pound  1.421  -0.438  16.39  1.464  .242 
(1.131)  (1.136) 
*See  footnote  to  table  2.  The  data  appendix  describes  the 
consumption data  underlying the results reported above. parity model, they  do not justify a large shift  in priors. Figure 
5 illustrates why the consumption-based model  cannot  go very fat 
in  explaining  the risk  premium; it  compares the cx post  values  of 
the right-hand  sidos of equations (4) and (5),  using data for the 
first  regression  reported  in  table  3.  (This  is  a  completely 
representative  picture,  however.)  The  correlation  between  these 
two  variables  is  extremely  high:  price  levels  are  not  very 
variable  compared with exchange rates, and except at implausibly 
high levels of  risk aversion, aggregate consumption variability  is 
insufficient  to help much in explaining  excess  returns  in  the 
foreign exchange market. 
Hodrick (1987) reviews a largely negative body  of  evidence on 
consumption-based  international  asset  pricing  models.28 Slightly 
more  favorable  results  have  been reported  recently  by  Cushy 
(1988), Hodrick  (1989), and  Obetfeld (1989a). Nonetheless, the low 
explanatory  power of these models precludes any strong  inferences 
about  the validity  of a  portfolio-balance rationale for sterilized 
intervention.  Perhaps  the  point  to  take  home  is  that cx post 
exchange-rate  variability  is so high relative  to  that of other 
variables  in all  of  the models  reviewed  that  only the weakest 
conclusions  can be drawn from tha econometric record. 
III. Intervention as a Signal to  Exchange Markets 
The failure of  risk  models to explain the apparent deviations 
from uncovered  interest  parity  has  led  some  researchers  to 









































































































































































 conclude  that  participants  in  exchsnge  markets  ignore  easily 
available  information  about  exchange  rates  and  make  biased 
exchange-rate  forecasts.29  Others  researchers  interpret  the 
negative  results  as  evidence  of weaknesses  in  the  econometric 
methods and the empirical  risk models  that have been  applied° 
Members  of both achools  agree,  however,  that  there  is  a 
channel  through which  sterilized  intervention  can move exchange 
rates  even  when bonds  of  different  currency  denomination  are 
perfect  substitutes.  That channel  is  the  new information  about 
economic  conditions and future economic  policies  that the volume 
and  direction  of  intervention  may  signal  to  the  aarkot 
independently of  any other current policy  changes. Marston  (1988) 
provides  an  interesting  comparative  discussion  of  two 
episodes--the Carter administration's dollar  support operations of 
late  1978,  and  the  Plara  declaration--in  which  sterilized 
intervention  accompanied  explicit  policy  announcements  aimed  at 
changing the course of  exchange markets. 
Notice  that  the signalling  effect of intervention might  not 
be  detectable  by  means  of  econometric  teats  such  as  those 
discussed  in section II, because forward-rate forecast errors can 
be  uncorrelated with lagged intervention despite being correlated 
with contemporaneous  intervention. This correlation  pattern could 
29Froot  and Frankel (1989) suggest this as one possible explanation 
(among  others) for  the results of their  study  of survey  data on 
exchange-rate expectations. 
One  type  of  econometric  problem,  which  arises  when  large 
infrequent  interventions can disturb the data-generating  process, 
is  the  "peso  problem,"  (See Lewis  1988  and  Obstfeld  1988  for 
discussions.)  Peso problems are clearly of potential  relevance in 
analyzing  recent exchange-market data. 
36 occur if,  for example,  currency-denominated  bonds  were  perfect 
substitutes,  expectations  were  rational,  and  sterilized 
intervention helped  significantly  in  predicting  future  monetary 
policies.  While  the  results  of  section  II  allow  no  direct 
inferences about  the signalling  effect,  alternative  econometric 
tests of signalling  can be  designed.  In  a  study  covering  the 
period 1977-1981, Dominguez  (1988) provides empirical support  for 
the proposition  that Federal Reserve  intervention  has  at  times 
communicated informatiou  useful  for  predicting  future  monetary 
31 
policies. 
Consideration  of  episodes such  as those described by  Marsto 
raises three fundamental  (and closely connected>  questions  about 
the hypothesis  that sterilized intervention affects exchange rates 
through  a  signalling  mechanism.  First,  what  information  is 
contained in  interventions that is not  contained  in  the  verbal 
policy announcements  that typically  complement  intervention  and 
sometimes substitute  for it? Second, why should sterilized foreign 
exchange intervention, rather  than  other  reallocations  of  the 
government's  asset  portfolio,  be  particularly  effective  in 
signalling  official intentions or information? For example,  would 
it  not be  equally effective to signal that  currency  depreciation 
31Dominguez  shows  that  in  the  period  from  the  Fed's 
monetary-targeting  shift  in  October  1979  until  the  following 
spring, there is a significant positive relationship between money 
surprises (defined as Fed money announcements  less  Money  Market 
Survey  forecasts)  and  official  U.S.  purchases  of  foreign 
currencies carried  out  in  the  interval  between  forecast  and 
announcement. Her interpretation is that the Fed used  intervention 
to signal information  about monetary policy not reflected  in  the 
prior  market  forecast. 
37 is desired  through  open-market  sales of domestic bonds  that  are 
subsequently  sterilized"  by an  offsetting  increase in  commercial 
banks'  rediscount  quotas?  Third,  what,  if anything,  assures  the 
market  that  the  signals  sterilized  intervention  conveys  are 
credible?  In  other  words,  are  there  coats  that  discourage 
governments from sending deceptive  signals in  attempts  to obtain 
short-  term advantages? 
An  obvious  advantage  of foreign-exchange  intervention  as a 
signalling  device  is that  it can be daployed rapidly  and  around 
the clock, with immediate  impact in the markets  where  exchange 
rates  are set. The difficulties one  feces in  taking  the analysis 
of  intervention  signals  beyond  this  observation  were  well 
summarized  by  Tobin (1963),  in a  discussion  of  the  role  of 
discount-rate changes in  monetary management: 
For many students  of central bank policy  the psychology  of the 
announcement is the most important and perhaps the only important 
aspect of the discount  rate, Unfortunately  there  is little  of a 
systematic  character  that ten be said shout  it. Will  the public 
conclude from the announcement of a fell in the discount rate that 
predictions of recession are now confirmed by the expert economic 
intelligence  of  the  central  benk,  and  therefore  regard  the 
announcement as a deflationary portent?  Or  will the market  judge 
that the authorities  have tbua indicated their resolute intention 
of preventing  deflation,  arresting  and  reversing  the  recession, 
and accordingly  interpret  the  announcement  as an  inflationary 
sign?  What do  the  authorities  themselves  regard  as  the  likely 
psychological  effects  of their  announcements? Clearly  it is easy 
to  become  enmeshed in a game  of  infinite  regress  between  the 
central bank  and the market. 
In  the  quarter-century  since  this  passage  was  published,  some 
progress  has  been  made  in  systematically  modelling  the 
announcement  effects  of sterilized  intervention.  It is fair  to 
say, however,  that the models put forward so fer are not close  to 
38 representing  the full range  of government  concerns  that motivate 
intervention. 
One reason  sterilized  intervention may send  more  informative 
and more  credible  signals  than  announcements  or  other  public 
debt-management  policies  centers on  the effect  of unanticipated 
exchange-rate  changes on the government's net worth,  (Mussa, 1981, 
discusses  the relevance of  this effect.) For example, a government 
that buys foreign  exchange  on a sterilized  basis-  -  thereby  going 
long  in foreign  currency  and  short  in domestic--will  lose  more 
money  than it  otherwise  would  have lost if  its  own  currency 
subsequently  appreciates by a percentage  amount  greater than the 
nominal  interest differential. Public  finance considerations  thus 
lend  credibility  to a government that uses sterilized purchases of 
foreign  exchang  to signal a  future depreciation  of the domestic 
currency;  conversely,  sterilized  sales  of  foreign  currency  may 
communicate  a credible  signal  that  policies  to  appreciate  the 
domestic  currency will  be pursued. The expectations created when  a 
policy  authority  "puts  its money where  its mouth is" in this way 
can move  exchange rates even  under perfect asset substitutability. 
As  an  illustration,  suppose  that  the  U.S.  Treasury's 
Exchange  Stabilization  Fund  decides  to  intervene  in marks  to 
support  the dollar's exchange rate against the German  currency. A 
hypothetical  possibility  is  that  the ESF draws  on a mark credit 
line  with  the  Bundesbank  (borrowing  DM  10  million,  say)  and 
purchases  dollar  securities on the open  market  (say,  $5 million in 
U.S.  Treasury  bills  at an exchange rate of OH 2 per dollar). The 
effect  on  the U.S.  government's balance sheet is: 
39 Balance Sheet of the  11.5.  Government 
Change in  Assets  Change in  Liabilities 
+ $5  million  ON  10  million 
This  intervention  has  no  effect  on  the  U.S.  monetary  base. 
Although  its  monetary  effects  in  the  US.  are  therefore 
sterilized,  the  intervention  does  alter  U.S.  incentives: having 
gone  long  in  dollars and abort in  marks, the Treasury  is now more 
wilnerable  to an unanticipated  rise  in the mark's  dollar  price. 
Foreign-exchange  traders may therefore view the Treasury's  action 
as  a  signal  that  American  policies  consistent  with  dollar 
-  -  32 
appreciation are in  store. 
In November  1978,  the  announcement  thst  the U.S.  Treasury 
would  sell "Carter  bonds"  denominated in marks  and Swiss  francs 
may initially have  altered market forecasts by  appearing  to reduce 
the 1J.S. government's  incentive to inflate.  <The rapid unwinding 
of the  initial  favorable  market  response  to the  Carter  package 
illustrates  the perils  of  intervention signals that are not  backed 
up  promptly by  concrete  policy  changes.)  Similarly,  recent 
proposals that  the U.S. government borrow yen rather than  dollars, 
put forward by  the Economist  magazine  and  others,  build  on the 
32The  intervention  does  raise  Cermany's  monetary  base by DM 10 
million  (assuming  the  Bundesbank  doesn't  sterilize),  but  the 
currency  composition  of  the  Bundesbank's  balance  sheet  is  not 
changed. 
40 idea  of  stabilizing  currency  markets  by  reducing  the  U.S. 
temptation  to default partially  on external dollar  debts  through 
an inflation of  dollar prices. 
The  foregoing  idesa  can be  formalized  in  the  context  of 
recent  research  on dynamic  optimal  taxation, Work by Lucas  and 
Stokey  (1983),  Persson,  Persson,  and Svensson  (1987), Calvo  and 
Obstfeld  (1988),  and  Obarfeld  (1989h) has  shown  how government 
debt-management  policies,  such  as  changes  in  the  maturity 
structure  of  government  debt  or  in  the  mix  between  real  and 
nmminal  public  liabilities,  can  enhance  the  credibility 
(technically  speaking,  the  dynamic  consistency)  of  optimal 
government plans.  More  generally, alternative debt strategies  can 
miter  the economy's  equilibrium  path.,e-en  when the expectations 
theory of rh term sructure holds  and the Fisher  equation links 
the own returns or. real and nominal bonds. 
T'ne  basic  setup  assumed in this  literature  is one  in which 
the a' 7strusnt  must finance  expenciturea  ano  dent repayments  v_a 
dtst  '  d  taic.,.  sncluding  the  inflation  tax  on  monetary 
btlsncLc.  Snce  rhi  real  present  value  of  its  dent  repeynmnts 
dapends  a:  pnliciee,  patenriai  asset  rmvaiuations affect the  net 
margins:  bet5tt  to  tcs  government  of  any  contemplates  policy 
change.  Resltsing  tnis  linkage,  the  pubric  uses  government 
portfolio  shifts, which change marginal  government  incentives,  tt 
predict  future policy  shifts. As a result, government  asset swaps 
such as sterilized  intervention, which  might appear  pointless  at 
first  glance,  can alter  expectations  systematically,  and can be 
anasyred  by  metnoda  analogous  to those  that  have been used  t. 
41 analyze  the  expectational effects  of  other types  of  off-cis1 
portfolio  shift. 
As suggested  above,  a  government  that  buys  home-currency 
bonds and sells foreign bonds may reduce its own future incentives 
to creates•.tprise  inflation, and thereby  lead traders  to  infer 
that the hoae currency  will be stronger  in the  future  than  they 
had  previously  believed.  Given  current  money  supplies,  the 
sterilized  sale  of  foreign  currency  will-  thus  cause  a  spot 
appreciation of  the home  currency. Bohn (1988) develops a model of 
the  type  described  above  to  examine  the  incentive  effects  of 
government operations  in  foreign 
Such models  could  be useful  in understanding  tha apparently 
stronger  effects  of  concerted,  as  opposed  to  unilateral, 
intervention, If the Japanese authorities  coordinate  their dollar 
33gackus  and  Kehoe  (1988)  also  mention  the  possible  strategic 
effects  of  sterilized  intervention,  but  do  not  suggest  a 
particular  model.  Bohn's  account  stresses  that  a  nationalistic 
government  will be motivated nor only  by its own  budgetary  needs 
but by its potential  ability to alter  the net real foreign asset 
position  of  the  domestic  private  sector,  For  example,  if  the 
domestic  public  has  a  net  foreign  debt  denominated  in horn 
currency,  the government  has  an added  incentive  to inflate. The 
welfare  effects 
-  of  policy-induced  wealth  zedistributions  from 
foreigners  to domestic  residents are likely  to be large corpared 
with  the  costs  of  tax  distortions  (which  determine  the 
welfare value of  wealth  transfers from the domestic public  to the 
government). If  bonds are perfect substitutes, however, individusl 
portfolio  composition  is indeterainste in equilibrium,  as is the 
direction  of  the  wealth  redistribution  associated  with  an 
exchsnge-rate  change. In this setting,  the government  might  well 
lack sufficient  information to calculate  the effect  on net foreign 
wealth various actions. gven  if U.S. treasury bonds were initially 
placed  with  Japanese  investors, say,  there  is nothing  to prevent 
the original buyers  from quickly selling the bonds  to Americans  in 
the secondary market  and investing the proceeds in, say, sterling. 
42 purchases  with  official  American  sales  of  yen,  the  Japanese 
government's  gains  from  yen  appreciation,  and  the  U  S. 
government's  gains  from dollar  depreciation,  both  decline.  The 
positive  effect  on the dollars  value  would  he smaller  if Japan 
intervened  alone  and  the  Ametiran  government's  incentives 
didn't change. 
How  powerful  in  practice  are  the  budgetary  incentives 
underlying  these idema? In  testimony before Congress shortly after 
the Plaza  announcement,  Stephen  1-1.  Axilrod,  then Federal Reserve 
Staff  Director  for  Monetary  and  Financial  Policy,  felt  it 
necessary to commene on the budgetary  implications of recent U S. 
purchases  of foreign  currencies.  After  pointing  out  that  lower 
intereat  earnings  on  those  investments  might  be  offset  by an 
appreciation  of  foreign  curronciea  against  the  dellar,  he 
concluded  that any net effect  "would be very  amall absolutely  and 
relatire to Treasury receipts,  Economic theory implies. howevet, 
that 
'  "os'  On tI r  gnrernnent  f  reign exc5args losner should be 
rear '  -  rt' n .  of  tee ammo of  t.r  mIs  ahadov 
price  I  g tb diff_mlty  thc  gnaetrcnent  vould encounter  in 
replacIng  ,h  resources.  A  govere.ncnt  that is already  rnnnir.g 
a  large deficit will vies a glvon los  a; mm  reedy n'r.n;  wood a 
govetnnent with  a balanced  bsdge'. 
This is not  to say  that prhlic  sector  bares  et  exchange 
markets have not been large in  some years. Ceraany lost well  over 
PM 9 billion on ita reserves in 1987 ma a result of the dollar's 
34Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1986, p.  17. 
43 depn iacion  sc-c  tabLe  6  belc#  This  loss  had  a  substcctiai 
i!rpac  on  the  country's  public-sector  deficit  and  caused  the 
Ferman government considerable dorestc embarrassment. 
lncerestir.g  as thcy are, the publinfinance  nodels are quite 
specialized:  they capture only one aspect of  goverusent behavior, 
and probably  not  the most important crc.  In reality, governments 
pursue many gcals  r.ot  present  these  models,  such  as high 
erployment,  and  respond  to purely political  events,  such  as 
sactcral pressures  for protection  Furthermore,  the ohservability 
assumptions  of these models,  which ren re  full public  knowledge 
cf  government  preferences,  ccnstraints  and  inforoation,  an 
inadequate for addressing  some  issues. 
Stein  (1988)  presents  a  simplc  incomplete-information  model 
in which  the  market  cannot  observe  directly  the  authorities' 
utility trade-off between  an exchange-rate  target  and a  domestic 
policy  target. Uncertainty  over official preferences  prevents  the 
market  from accurately f'-recssting future monetary  policy.  8ecause 
of the temptation to  manipulate the  currant exchange  rate  through 
a  time-inconaisrant  policy,  the  authorities  cannot  credibly 
announce  the  future  level  of  the  money  supply.  Surprisingly, 
however?  the  authorities  car. credibly  communicate  some  of  their 
private  information  to  the  marker,  and  in  a  way  that  favorably 
affects  the current exchange  rate.  Specifically,  the authorities 
can  credibly  announce  a  range  of  future  exchange-rate  targets, 
even though  the  announcement of  any  precise policy  target is  not 
credible.  Aside  from  rationalizing  the  recent  6-7  practice  of 
indicating only  broad  target  ranges  for  exchange  rates,  Stein's 
44 model  suggests that intervention itself could provide a noisy hut 
credible message about policymakers' private information, 
Intervention may be costly foc a government, as  noted earlier, 
with costs  that depend on the private  information  the government 
has. While such signalling costs play no role in Stein's analysis, 
they may allow  the market  to use observed  interventions for more 
precise  inferences about  that data available  to the authorities, 
Asymmetric  information  thus  provides  an  additional  mechanism 
through which intervention costa can lend credence to intervention 
aignmls. 
Uncertainty has additional  implications for intervention that 
any  realistic  analysis  must  recognize.  Policymakers  have 
imperfect  information  about  market  fundamentals;  for  example, 
they  usually are unable  to observe directly shifts in  comparative 
advantage  or  the  location  of  new  international  investment 
opportunities.  By  "testing  the  market"  through  intervention, 
authorities  may  gain  a  better  idea  of  whether  particular 
exchange-rate movements represent transitory factors that ought to 
be offset--such  as  erroneous  rumora  about  future  policies--or 
permanent  developments  that it would be unwise  to resist through 
monetary  adjustments.  Government  agencies may well  lose money in 
carrying  out  such  exploratory  intervention  operations,  but  at 
least  part of  this  cost  can  be  viewed  as  a  price  paid for 
insight  into  market  conditions,  Generally,  individual  market 
actora  will  also  gain  information  by observing  the  effects  of 
official interventions. 
Economics  is still  far  from a full account  of the signals 
45 an.:  •  a  - £  tut.  SLOtS  that  might  make  ticce 
signals  oeie aSia  In  analyzing  the  aignallng  effects  of 
anerv€ntion,  pcLctical  analysis currently  has  no  choice  hut  tc 
sly  cn  an  in  caal  vei,hing  of  the  myriad  factors  entaring 
goseaulsit  prefcroccca  ord  information  sets  and  influencing 
government  constraints. 
lv.  Racent  Foreign-Exchange  Intsc;enton: Ac Astessment 
Earlier  aectors  of  this  pepe  do.:: acted  the  macroeconor5 
adjustments that  have  accorpenied  the  :c  a  decline  fcoa  it 
peak  in  early  1985.  and  cavScued  ft Lheory  and  e000roet it 
evidence  concerning  the  use  of  sterilized  intervention  as  tin 
additional  instrument  of  macroaconomic  policy  alongs  ida 
traditional monetary  and  fiscal policy.  The  econosetric  evidi ncr 
iS  consistent  with  the  1983  finding  of  the  Working  Group  a 
gacharge  Fe rket  Intervention,  ited in the  Introduction,  that ttr 
par.fclio  effects  of r  -:  z  a  trr rttio  cr0  weak  es-opt 
ucesibly,  in  the  -ery  tact  m  -  E..  thc  Warking  Group  dLat 
,icogniacd,  however,  tao  ig-'sF.-g  effrc  of  exchenge-nacke' 
:nlervention  is  of  potential  itpcrtance.  Unfortunately, it  it 
difficult,  except  within models  too  stylizod  to  he  immediately 
useful  to  policymakers,  to design  signels to rho exohanfe  market 
that  are credible and  clerefore effective. 
Intervention,  oftcn  sterilized  and  often  concerted,  het 
nonetheless  loomed  lerge in  recent  currency  experiente,  so it it 
important  to  ask whether  end though what channels  intervention has 
aided  in  promoting ti--  985-88  realignment.  'n this section 1  try to answer  this question by examining  the timing  and magnitude  of 
interventions  by  the  three  largest  industrial  countries.  The 
message  in  the  data  appears  to be  that  monetary  and  fiscal 
actions,  rather  than  sterilized  interventions,  have  been  the 
dominant policy  determinants of the broad  exchange-rate movements 
of  recent  years. On  several occasions, however,  intervention seem 
to have been  effective in  signalling to exchange markets the major 
governments'  resolve  to adjust  other  macroeconomic  policies,  if 
necessary,  to  achieve  exchange-rate  goals.  On  other  occasions, 
authorities  have  been convinced  by exchange-market  pressures  to 
modify  these  goals  rather  than  to  make  fully  accommodating 
monetary or fiscal changes. Sterilized intervention has not helped 
governments  resolve  conflicts  between  internal  and  external 
balance in an! fundamntsl  way. 
Intervention Data  for the United  States, Germany, and Japan, 
1985-1988 
Table  4 reports  the  dollar  value  of  net  U.S.  open-market 
purchases  of foreign currencies, both by the Federal Reserve  and 
the ESF.  For reasons  to be discussed  in a moment,  these  data do 
not  capture  completely  quarterly  changes  in  the  U.S.  official 
foreign asset position, which might be more  relevant for assessing 
the  portfolio  effects  of  intervention.  Given  its  small  size 
relative to the global supply of dollar assets, however, the most 
interesting  aspect of U.S. intervention is its possible signalling 
effect, which  is well captured by the data on  market  transactions 
reported in  table 4. 
47 Table 4 
United  States: Open-Market  Purchases of  Foreign Exchange 
(Billions of  U.S. dollars; purchases. +) 
1985:1  0.7 
2  0.0 
3  0.2 
4  3.1 
1986:1  0.0 
2  0.0 
3  0.0 
4  0.0 
1987:1  -1.5 
2  -3.4 
3  0.3 
4  -3.9 
1988:1  -1.0 
2*  -34 
*Includes intervention purchases of  foreign exchange during  July. 
Source: Data for 1985-1987 from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 
1988,  table  22;  1988  data  from Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  April 
1988, July  1988, and October 1988. Table  S  reports  changes in the dollar  values  of German  and 
Japanese  foreign  exchange  reserves.  The  numbers  in  table  S 
include,  along  with  changes  in central-bank  reserve  holdings, 
changes  in  the net  foreign  claims  of other  government  agencies 
that intervene in  financial markets, Also included are changes due 
to  exchange-rate  induced  fluctuations  in  the  dollar  value  of 
existing  nondollat  reserves;  but  despite  this  valuation 
discrepancy,  the nuabers in  table S are reasonably well correlated 
with the dollar  value  of actual  foreign exchange acquisitions by 
the  two  countries'  authorities.  Because  of  German  EMS 
interventions,  the reported series  is significantly mote  reliable 
as an indicator of  dollar acquisitions for Japan than  for Germany. 
The intervention series probably most  useful  in assessing the 
pressure  of  intervention  on  domestir  financial  markets  is  the 
domestic-currency  value  of  official  foreign  asset 
acquisitions-  -essentially,  the  balance  of payments  in  domestic 
currency.  This  variable  captures  the  incipient  addition  to 
domestic base money resulting  from intervention.  Table 6 reports 
quarterly  data  on the  mark value  of Bundesbank  mcquisitions  of 
reserve  assets.  Capital  gains  on  existing  reserves,  which  are 
excluded from  the acquisition  data, appear  in the second rolumn.3 
Suth  capital  gains  do  not  put  direct  pressure  en  domestic 
35The  coverage  of table 6  is potentially  broader  than that of 5, 
because  5 excludes  foreign assets  other  than those  classified by 
the  IMF as foreign  exchange reserves,  for  example,  SDRs and  the 
IMF  reserve  position.  Notice  that  the capital  gains  reported  in 
table 6 are changes in  the mark (not dollar) value of  reserves; in 
some quarters,  these  data measure capital gains inexactly because 
they include SDR allocations. 
48 Table 5 
Germany and  Japan:  Increase in Dollar Value of 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(gillions of  U.S. dollars) 
Germany  Japan 
1985:1  -2.9  0.2 
2  2.3  0.9 
3  3.1  -0.3 
4  1.5  -0.8 
1986:1  0.8  1.2 
2  -0.9  5.9 
3  4.3  7.5 
4  2.6  0.7 
1987:1  8.2  15.8 
2  2.3  10.5 
3  1.5  2.8 
4  15.0  8.9 
1988:1  -5.7  3.2 
2  -7.8  2.4 
3*  -5.7  2.3 
*Increase in  reserves from end of  June  to end of August. 
Source:  IMF,  World Economic  Outlook,  April  1988,  table  23;  and 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, line ld.d, various  issues. Table 6 
Germany: Bundeshank Foreign Asset Acquisitions and Capital Gains 
(Billions of  marks; acquisitions and  gains, +) 
Asset Acquisitions  Capital Gains 
1985:1  -12.6  4.2 
2  6.0  -2.7 
3  57  -2.3 
4  2.8  -2.3 
1986:1  2.2  -1.0 
2  -8.1.  1.1 
3  8.9  -1,0 
4  30  -2.2 
1987:1  16 2  -0.1 
2  o.B  -0.3 
3  -1.5  0.1 
4  22.7  -9.1 
1988:1  -2.9  -0.1 
2  -1.0.0  1.1 
3*  -11.2  1.0 
*Covers July  only. 
Source: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank,  September 1988, 
table ILl. For a more precise description  of "capital gains," see 
footnote 6 to table IX.l. financial markets, but they  can have significant  consequences  for 
the government's financea. 
Some caveats applying to all of the data  are in  order. Even 
in the absence of  valuation changes, the figures in  tables 5  and 6 
may  differ considerably  from outright  official  purchases  of 
foreign  exchange  in  the  open  market.  Interest  earnings  on  the 
Bundesbank's  dollar  assets,  for  axample,  when  reinvested  in 
dollars,  swell  the  hank's  net  foreign  assets,  even though  no 
transaction  in  the  foreign exchange market is directly  involved. 
As  argued  by  Adams  and  Henderson  (1983),  however,  such 
reinvestment  is correctly  thought  of as intervention,  since  the 
German government  could  have  used dollar interest  earnings  to 
reduce  the flow of mark-denominated  government  debt  into private 
portfolios,  simultaneously  leaving  more  dollar bonds  for  the 
private  market to  hold.  There are,  in addition,  some  problems  of 
measurement  related  to  off-balance-sheet  items,  end-of-quarter 
"window dressing" of  balance sheets, and so  on. 
Intervention and the Exchange Markets 
An informml review of  tsbles 4-6 in  the light of section l's 
nmrrstive  provides  a  vantage  from which  to  evaluate  recent 
intervention experience. 
Pre-Plaza  period  (January-September  1985).  Table  6  shows 
that  the  Bundesbsnk  intervened  heavily  in the  first  quarter  of 
1985 to  stop the dollar's rise to its peak; the U.S. intervened at 
the  smme  time,  but  on a  much  smaller  scale.  The  Bundesbsnk 
sterilized  its  intervention--in  the  Bundesbsnk's  published 
49 monetary  survey,  the  reduction  in  central-bank  money  due  to 
foreign  exchange  flows  in  the  first  quartet  of  1985  (DM  12.2 
billion) is aceompanid  by so  unusually large domestic open-carkec 
purchase undec  repurchsse  agreement  (DM 12.1 billion),  Short-term 
mark interest rates  showed  only a temporary  and relatively  small 
increase  in this  quartet.35 In the  two  subsequent  quartets,  the 
German  authorities  purchased  dollars  am  the dollar  depreciated, 
and  took  advantage  of  the  mark's  relative  strength  to  lower 
interest  rates  in the  face of a weak domestic  economy.  Japan's 
foreign  reserves  show a net rime  over  theme  two quarters  (table 
5);  the U.S.,  for the momt  part,  stayed on the aidelinea  (table 
4). All  told,  the period  ahowm no sustained,  coordinated  attempt 
to drive the dollar down through intervention. 
Plaza  to Louvre  (September  1985  -  February  1987).  In the 
last  quartet  of 1985  the U.S.  and Japan,  backing  up the  Plaza 
announcement,  both intervened  to push the dollar  down.  Germany 
also  carried  out  open-market  dollar  sales,  but  once  nonmarket 
transactions are  taken  into account,  its foreign reservea  show a 
net  increase  for  the  quartet  (tables  S  and  6).  Intervention 
clearly played  no role in  promoting  the dollar's depreciation over 
1986; U.S. activity was insignificant, and Japan bought dollars to 
counteract  yen appreciation.  Indeed, by the second half of 1986, 
the Bundesbank  had joined  Japan  in trying  to brake  the  dollar's 
fall  through  dollar  purchases,  but the  resulting  interventions 
36See  Monthly  Report  of  the Deurache  Bunderbank,  December  1986, 
table 1.3. 
SD 'ae:e  a,l'c,-ed  i,  i-r  cuhatant4  effect on  i 't'erese ra,es  I - 
ther  enuno'.y,  and  were  Ineffective > 
Only  after  Geraacy  a' rI 
:-pan decisively  lowered  interest rates  in  January  1987, and tic 
lot  xvened at rn*i  end, did the dollar atahilire briafly' 
trna and-N-toter  1986  te end-January  1987,  the  tollar  price  ->6 
racks  had rie  by 10,3  percent  and that  of  yen  b-a  5.9 rercent 
The  S nC-  shank  ,tas  aumucrired  the-  aperace f intervention it 
he  -tenth,>  befotc the Louvre accord as  follows: 
These  [inetvent1on]  efforts  were  in  "sin,  not  least  he'--usc 
s  etements by  U  S  officials repeatedly  or used  the  impression  '>n 
ti-c  markets  that  the  U  S.  authorities  wanted  the  do11>:  tn 
depreciate further  Mor 'over  until  then  Jate January  1977  the 
Americans  hardly  participated in  the  operatioos  to  supporr their 
:urrency.  Nor  did  the  Federal  Reserve  counteract  the  downworo 
send in the dollar throogh monetary policy measures,  deepthe  r.r 
risks to price rtcbility which  it  clearly  perceived, 
tvident]y,  pure  intervention  by Japan and  Oerrany  had  Th'tth 
effect  compared  aith corcrcte  monetary  poLcy actions,  f,>acteb3e 
news on the U.S.  'radc  balance,  a pointedly  visible  re-entry  of 
the  US.  into  the  foreign  exchange  market,  and  a  nonc 
etroightfcrward  !.nericrn  acknowledgment  that the time for dollar 
stabiliration had comeS5 
From  the Loovre  to the crash  (February-Ootober l9t7  .  After 
the Louvre  accord  the yen appreciated  substantially  in spite  of 
On  Bundesbank  dollar  purthasos  over 1986,  see  Report of  the 
°eursoh° Bondesbeok  for the Year  1987, p. 29. 
>5Reporr  of the Dentacha Boodesbank  for the Year  1986, p. 63. 
>The U.S. intervention, however, amounted to a mere  $50 million in 
yen ao.d on  January  28,  1987  (Federal Reserve Bniletin, May 1987, 
p.  333). Thic  intervention was  intended  to undursoote  the second 
Bsker-Miyszins  ttaterent, issued Jenusry 21 oae above), 
Si heavy  Japanese  dollar  purchases  in the first half of 1987  (table 
5).  (Germany's sizable  intervention  in the first quarter of  1987 
was motivated largely by an  EMS realignment episode.) On  March  11, 
the U.S. bought  $30 million  in  marks  to counteract  heavy private 
sales  of  the  German currency.  Pressure  on  the  mark  rapidly 
subsided,  but  then the yen befan to appreciate.  Between March  23 
and  April  6 the Fed intervened daily and purchased a  total of $3.0 
billion  with yen; between  April  7  and 17,  the Fed intervened  on 
three occasions, buying  $532 million,45 These operations marked the 
first  major  U.S.  interve,tion  in foreign  exchange rarkits  since 
the  Plaza  period in  late  1985,  but  intervention  now aimed  at 
supporting  the dollar,  not bringing  it dawn.  The  Bundesbank  and 
other  European  central  baaka  also  participated  in these  dollar 
support  operations.  Presrare  on  the  yen  eased  only  after  the 
dollar-yen  Interest differential widened substantially (see figure 
4), and industrial-country exchange  rates remained roughly stable 
nntli  Irs vr.'lGwide  stnc,cmaraet crash in  Octuoer. As  noted aoove, 
this stabtLI'y over euc  ..c  monetary pol.,cias 
Fron Inc crash  to the Toronto  summit  foctober l987-Juns 
1988). Corcertad offtc.al purchases of  doatars began at  the end of 
October  and  continued  tnrough  January.  All  three  countries 
intervened heavily to support tne dollar, and  as  a result of  these 
and  earlier  operations,  the  overall  increases  in  German  and 
Japanese  foreign reserves over 1987 are remarkably large. In  spite 
of  this heavy  intervention, the dollar depreciated by  16.2 percent 
408ee Federal Reserve Bulletin, July  1987, pp. 553-555. 
52 against  the mark,  and by 18.5  percent  against  the yen,  between 
end-September  and end-December  1987, before  partially  recovering 
and stabilizing  in in the  last part  of January  1988.  From  then 
until  mid-June,  the  dollar-mark  and dollar-yen  exchange  rates 
fluctuated  within relatively  narrow  ranges.  The  U.S.  conducted 
moderate  dollar  support  operations  in March  and  April  of 1988, 
while  Japan  intervened  more  heavily  to  discourage  yen 
appreciation.  Germany,  however,  allowed  its  reservea  to  fall 
during  the  period,  presumably  to  help counteract  a  perceived 
weakness of the mark.  Short-term mark  interest rates  also drifted 
upward  after  the end of January. Until  the second half of June, 
however,  the  interest  differential  favoring  dollar  over  mark 
assets  increased. 
W  Toronto  to  Berlin  (June-September  1988)  .  Sevoral 
developments, already  reviewed above, led to a sharp  appreciation 
of the  dollar  in June.  The U.S.  began  intervening  to discourage 
the dollar's  rise on June 27;  foreign-exchange  operations  by the 
U.S.  and  foreign  authorities,  sometimes  on  a  large  ocalo, 
continued  through  the  summer.  By  early  September  the  dollar 
appeared once  again to  have stabilized;  but  from  end-May  to 
end-August,  the  U.S.  currency  had appreciated  by  7.9  percent 
against  the  mark and  by  7.2  percent  against  the  yen,  despite 
forceful coordinated  intervention efforts. 
How  Effective Has Intervention Been? 
International  currency  experience  since  1985  lends  little 
support  to  the  idea  that  sterilized  intervention  has  been an 
53 important  determinant  of  exchange  ratea.  Anecdotal  evidencc 
suggeats  that  intervention  has  been  useful  as  a  device  for 
signalling to  exchange  markets official views en  currency values 
The  signals  sent  hy  4nterventon have  hecn  effective,  however 
only  when  thry  have  heen hacked  up  by  the  prompt  adjustment  of 
monetary  poflcles,  or wh. n ever ts  such  as  unexpected trade-balance 
news  have  coincidentally  altered  market  sentiment.  Concerted 
intervention np.ratinns have naturally  been the  most  convincing, 
since  intetnatienal  agreement  on exchange-rate  objectives ensures 
that  national autl'ori'i?  will  not  act  at crnss-putpeses,  as  they 
did  around  the end of Lii. 
Except  possibly  in  lirr7  and 1988, th  scale of interventinr 
ncr  simply  beau  to'  or  11  to  i,sva  hcd  sigeiYi nt portf' 'ir 
affectcr  P  .aecn  tn. riz  ,,n'n3ren  cr.Saptc .ar  12  and  thu 
c..,,  &chen.caof:iaan.—-n 
41See  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  February  1986,  p.  112.  As noted 
earlier, this figure may overstate the true extent of intervention 
becauae  it  omits  such  factors  as  intereat  earnings  on  dollar 
reserves.  Feldatein  (1986)  argues  that  the  intervention  that 
followed  the  Plaza  announcement  had  little  effect on  exchange 
rates. 
54 intervention totals for 1987-88  are much higher  than for 1985 
or 1986,  but even  so, the intervention provided at best a partial 
brake  on  exchange-market  pressures.  Germany's  official  external 
asset acquisitions  in 1987 were DM  41.2 billion, equal  to ronghly 
a third  of  its  year-end  currency  stock.  Most of  this  reserve 
inflow  was  sterilized  through  domestic  open-market  operations, 
however,  and  Germany's  stock of high-powered  central-bank  eoney 
rose  by only GM  15.5  billion  in  1987.  in  1986,  when reserve 
inflows  were much lower,  central-bank  money  rose by DM  13.1 
billion. How large were  the effects of  this GM 41.2  billion inflow 
on the supply  of mark-denominated  bonds?  OECD  estimates  snggear 
that the  net  debt of the German  government  in 1987  was  no core 
than  25  percent  of GNP,  or 081  505.8  million.  The  198?  reserve 
inflow thus represented  more than  8 percent of  Germany's  total nor 
public  debt-  -a large  number, but not large  enough  to prevent  a 
sharp  mark appreciation  against  the  dollar  over  l98?.  It  is 
doubtful that  sterilized  interventions on  this scale  could be the 
norm  in  a  viable  target-zone  system.  As  noted  above,  the 
interventions  had a serious adverse  effect  on Germany's  public 
finances. 
Japan,  too, sterilized much of  the massive reserve inflow it 
experienced  as a result of its  own  1987  interventions.  Foreign 
42See Monthly  Report  of the Deutsche Bundesbank,  Seprember  1988. 
table 1.3; GEGO, Economic Outlook 43, June 1988, p.  27.  To assess 
the intervention's  effect on relative bond supplies,  the entire 
foreign  reserve  inflow  (and not just  the sterilized  portion)  is 
counted  as an addition  to  the  stock  of  outstanding  mark debt, 
because  monetary-base  growth  not  brought  about  by  foreign asset 
purchases would  otherwise have been brought about by purchases of 
mark  assets. 
55 assets  of the Japanese  monetary  authorities  increased  by V  5.1 
trillion in  that year,  yet high-powered money  rose by only V  2,8 
trillion,  compared  with a rise of Y 2.4 trillion  in l986. OECI) 
estimates put Japan's 1987 net public debt  at  around 25  percent of 
GNP, or V 86.2 trillion."  So  Japan's V 5.1 trillion  1987 reserve 
increase  amounted  to roughly  6  percent  of the net public  debt. 
(And  this  figure  is  an understatement,  because  it  includes yen 
capital losses on official Japanese foreign reserves, suffered as a 
result of the dollar's  1987 depreciation.) Although  too large and 
costly to become  a way  of life  for the Japanese  government,  the 
intervention  of  1987  still  did  not  prevent  a  substantial  yen 
appreciation  ov,er the course of that year. 
Shifting fiscal  trends contributed  to the dollar's  fall from 
its peak of early  1985, but it is monetary policy  that has been 
the  more  important  instrument  of  medium-term  exchange-rate 
management. On  several  occasions, officials chose  to adjust  their 
exchange-rate  objectives  in the  face  of market  pressure,  rather 
than compromise domestic policy goals. Substantial  departures from 
internationally agreed exchange-rate targets occurred,  in spite of 
heavy  intervention,  in the three months  after  the Louvre  accord, 
in  the three months  following the October 1987 stock-market crash, 
435ee IMF, International Financial  Statistics, October  1988,  lines 
11 and  14.  As noted  below,  the dollar  depreciated  over  1987, so 
the V 5.1 billion figure understates  the expansionary pressure on 
Japan's money  supply;  it includes the negative  effect of capital 
losses on official dollar  reserves measured  in yen.  Such capital 
losses do  not directly reduce the high-powered money  supply. 
"See OECD, Economic Outlook 43, June  1988, p.  27. 
56 and in  the summer of  1988. 
If  effective  over  a  reasonably  long horizon,  sterilized 
intervention  could  ease  the  task  of  international  policy 
cooperation  by  giving  each  country  the  additional  policy 
instrument needed  to attain internal as well  as  external  targets. 
In  the absence of this additional instrument, however, authorities 
inevitably  encounter  dilemmas  as a result of attempts  to gear 
monetary  policy  to exchange-rate  stabilization  alone. A nominal 
exchange  rate  fixed  by  monetary  means  provides  an  efficient 
automatic  offset  to purely  monetary  disturbances,  but a monetary 
policy that  steadies the nominal exchange  rate when real exchange 
rate adjustment  is still  necessary  can be counterproductive.  It 
causes  some  combination  of unnecessary  deflation  at home and 
inflation  abroad  when a real  depreciation  of home  currency  is 
needed, and it causes  some combination of  unnecessary  inflation at 
home  and deflation  abroad when  real  appreciation  is  needed.45 The 
"black Monday"  of  October 1987 has often be-en attributed  to fears 
that the  Federal  Reserve  would  raise  interest rates  farther  to 
keep  the  dollar  within its  Louvre  1imits  despit  th-G  apparent 
incompatibility of the prevailing real exchange rate with  external 
balance46 Had the  Fed  taken  this  course,  the  real  dollar 
depreciation that octurred after the  crash would have been brought 
45The  responses  of  alternative  exchange-rate  reg-lmes  to various 
shocks  are  analyzed in Obstfeld  (1985). Controls  on cross-border 
capital  movements  are  a possible  way  out  of  the  dilemma  of 
instrument  insufficiency,  but  it  is  fanciful  to  think  that  a 
reversal  of the  trend  toward  more  global  financial  markets  is 
fully enforceable  or,  at  the:  moment, politically  feasible. 
6See,  for example, Fldstein (1988). 
57 about,  not by a relatively pafnleaa fall in the dollar's noninal 
value, but by a recession originating in the United States. 
58 Data Appendix 
The  following  data  wore  used  in  the  econometric  work  of 
section  II,  and  in constructing figures 1-5: 
Moninaanterart rates  (R,  Re):  Three-month  Earorurrency  ratca 
at ncnth a  and,  f-too Data Resources  Inc -  (DPI) 
Soct archange rater  5):  End-of-month observations  from DEtS  Main 
Economic  indicators,  various  issues 
Mcci  par  canita  U.S.  consumption  (c)  and  price  level  (P)-: 
Separate  seasonally  unadjusted  series on  nominal  consumption  of 
services and of condurshies were  deflated by seasonally- unad) 'scnd 
trite indexes for consumption  of servicer and of nondu.rsbles  -  then 
divided  by  seasonally  unadjucted  dare  on  the  civiiinn 
noninatitutienal  population  of  thn  U.S.  The  resulting  pet capers 
real  consumption  data  were  desessonalised  by  iog-lincnt 
regression. Population  data  from Economic  Report of  the President, 
Eebruary  1988,  and from  U.S.  Deperttent  of  Labor,  Eureau  of  Labor 
Statistics,  Employment  and Earnings.  tonsumption  and price  dsts 
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